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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BENCHMARK, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SALT LAKE VALLEY MENTAL 
HEALTH BOARD, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, a political entity, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No, 910393 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff/appellee Benchmark has petitioned the court to 
rehear one specific aspect of the court's decision on defendants' 
Motion for Summary Disposition. That one aspect is the court's 
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ruling that damages, if any, are limited to $40,000.00 plus six 
months' rent. Benchmark's petition attempts to divide that one 
ruling into two issues, namely, one of contract ambiguity and one 
of law concerning the effect of termination notices on lease 
agreements. In actuality, in this case those are not two separate 
subjects but really are part and parcel of the same subject. 
However, they will be addressed separately for the purpose of 
responding specifically to Benchmark's petition. 
THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE CONTRACT 
WHICH WOULD MAKE IT SUBJECT TO PAROL EVIDENCE 
Benchmark has argued that the termination clause in 
question is ambiguous because it could have two possible meanings 
and therefore the parties' intent would need to be factually 
explored. That claim is somewhat ironic since it was Benchmark who 
initially argued there were no material issues of fact in this case 
and that, as a consequence, it was entitled to Summary Judgment as 
a matter of law. Benchmark is now saying the contract is ambiguous 
and that there are issues of fact remaining to be decided by the 
court. 
As was noted in defendants/appellants' original Motion 
for Summary Disposition, the contract term is not ambiguous. The 
intent of the parties is clear. The ambiguity that Benchmark 
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attempts to raise is in reality two different legal approaches to 
the contract rights contained within the subject clause. As was 
noted in defendants' original Motion, some courts take the position 
that a breach occurs when the notice of termination has not been 
given as exactly provided in the contract. Nonetheless, even under 
that interpretation, damages are limited to the amount which would 
have been obtained if the proper notice had been given. The second 
theory is that there is no breach but rather the defective notice 
is constructively deemed to extend to the proper time called for 
in the contract. The point is, under either theory the end result 
is exactly the same. 
In the instant case, defendants claimed that they 
terminated the lease "for cause." This issue has now been remanded 
to the trial court for a factual determination. The defendants 
also claim that at the very least they terminated the lease 
"without cause." If defendants are correct that they terminated 
the lease for cause, the damage limitation issue is moot. On the 
other hand, if it is determined, that defendant Salt Lake Mental 
Health did not terminate for cause, then the damage limitation 
issue is relevant. 
The issue at hand is created by the fact that the Lease 
allowed termination without cause upon six (6) months notice. If 
notice was given, then the Lease was terminated and future rent 
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waived except for six (6) months rent plus a portion of Benchmark's 
remodeling costs, not to exceed $40,000. The defendants gave 
notice of termination on October 31, 1989 with a termination date 
of January 1, 1990. Benchmark claims that the failure of the 
defendants to give a full six (6) months notice means the lease is 
still in full force and effect. Thus, the damage would be the rent 
for the remaining term of the Lease. The defendants maintain that 
the fact that the notice did not give a full six (6) months notice 
does not affect the damage limitation provision of the Lease and 
damages are at most six (6) months rent plus $40,000.00. 
Where a tenant gives a notice to terminate a lease but 
does not give the sufficient time period, some courts hold that 
the measure of damages would be the damages to which the landlord 
would have been entitled had the proper notice been given. Hence, 
the damages are limited to rent for the termination period and any 
other contractual damages. In the case at bar, this amount would 
be six (6) months rent plus the $40,000.00. Other courts would say 
that in such a case the defective termination notice is construed 
to take effect at the end of the full six months. In application 
of either line of cases, the damages are limited to $40,000.00, 
plus six months of rent. Regardless of which legal position is 
taken, the clause remains the same and does not present two 
different factual interpretations as to what it means. 
- 4 -
Benchmark argues that giving proper notice "is a 
condition precedent to the limitation of damages". Benchmark's 
Petition for Rehearing, p.4. That is clearly an argument of the 
application of law. It is not evidence of a factual ambiguity in 
the contract's terms. Moreover, defendants submit that Benchmark's 
interpretation is even bad law, as will be discussed more fully 
hereinafter. 
This court has the clause before it. The court can see 
for itself that the language is clear and unambiguous. In fact 
Benchmark has not even suggested how parol evidence would change 
the interpretation. The only differences in interpretation relate 
to different legal theories. There is thus no basis for parol 
evidence to be introduced to interpret that language since the 
intent of the parties is not in question. See, e.g., Ron Case 
Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomguist, 773 P. 2d 1382 (Utah 
1989); Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981). 
THE LIMITATION ON DAMAGES SET BY THIS COURT SHOULD STAND 
Benchmark contends that the cases cited by 
defendants/appellants in their Motion for Summary Disposition are 
employment cases and that somehow employment cases enjoy a special 
rule regarding termination notices, which rule is not applicable 
to interpretating termination rights in leases. Benchmark is in 
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error on both points. Osborn v. Commanche Cattle Industries, Inc., 
545 P. 2d 827 (Okl. App. 1975) involved a contract for the 
maintenance of certain feedlot facilities. It was not a case of 
an employer and an employee but rather two separate businesses 
engaged in a contract. Likewise in Shain v. Washington National 
Insurance Co., 308 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1962), the parties were an 
insurance company and a general agent. The general agent 
complained about the termination of his agency agreement, i.e., his 
business, not about the termination of his employment. Further, 
the court in Shain made it clear that the principle they were 
applying was valid, regardless of the type of contract: 
And it is the general rule that where a contract, whether 
it be one for employment or for insurance or of a 
different kind, requires written notice of cancellation 
upon a stated time, a notice failing to meet the time 
requirement, but otherwise appropriate, is nonetheless 
effective upon the lapse of the time required by the 
contract. 
Id. at. 614. Emphasis added. 
Perhaps the better question to ask is whether the 
landlord/tenant relationship is so different from other types of 
contracts that a rule which might be applicable to that 
relationship would not be applicable to any other contract 
relationship or vice versa. The argument raised by Benchmark is 
that an employment relationship does not contemplate substantial 
- 6 -
capital expenditures and hence strict compliance with a termination 
notice is "less significant in an employment action." Benchmark's 
Petition for Rehearing, p.9. That comment ignores the substantial 
financial commitment an employee may make in moving to a new 
location to take a specific job. It also fails to note that 
Benchmark's bargain with defendants was that at any time the lease 
was terminated by the tenants without cause, the landlord would be 
entitled to six months of rent plus a percentage of the remodeling 
costs, not to exceed $40,000.00. With that type of a guarantee, 
Benchmark would presumably be able to have sufficient rent and 
monies to cover any potential loss if defendants left the premises 
early. 
Most importantly, that argument by Benchmark has been 
nullified by this court recently when it declared that 
landlord/tenant law is to be governed by general principles of 
contract law. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010, 1015 (Utah 
1991). Thus the attempt by Benchmark to claim special provisions 
of law applicable to this case because it involves a lease is 
without foundation in the law. 
The number of cases supporting the principles enunciated 
in both the Osborn case and the Shain case is impressive. The 
following cases follow the rule annunciated in Shain that if the 
notice is deficient, it will be construed by the court to extend 
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to the period which would have been sufficient under the contract 
terms. Interestingly enough, many of these cases involve 
landlord/tenant disputes over lease terminations. 
In the case of Camalier & Buckley-Madison, Inc. v. 
Madison Hotel, Inc., 513 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the issue was 
whether a landlord's notice to quit was sufficient, since it did 
not give the full five days required by the lease. The court held 
that if there was a deficiency, the court would extend the notice 
to the proper day and assess damages up to that proper day. 
See also Raynor v. Burroughs Corp. , 294 F.Supp. 238 (E.D. 
Va. 1968); All States Service Station, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 
120 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Medical Professional Bldg Corp. v. 
Ferrell, 131 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App. 1939) (90 day termination notice 
in lease); Worthinqton v. Moreland Motor Truck Co., 140 Wash. 528, 
25 0 Pac. 3 0 (19 26) (month to month tenancy); G.B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. 
v. Helena Rubenstein, Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 561, 393 N.E.2d 460 (1979); 
Entis v. Atlantic Wire & Cable Corp., 335 F. 2d 759 (2nd Cir. 1964). 
The following cases, like Osborn, limit the damages to 
those which would have been recovered if the proper termination 
notice had been given. See, e.g., Cottman v. State, Dept. of 
Natural Resources, 51 Md. App. 380, 443 A.2d 638 (1982) (breach of 
lease damages limited to those incurred during termination period); 
W.K. Ewing Co. v. New York State Teachers Retirement Sys. , 197 
- 8 -
N.Y.S.2d 364 (N.Y. App. 1960); Pecarovich v. Becker, 248 P.2d 123 
(Cal. App. 1952) . 
Interestingly enough, none of the cases which extend the 
defective termination to the proper period have ever commented on 
the cases which call for strict enforcement of the termination 
notice provisions but then limit the damages. The same is true of 
the damage cases in commenting on the cases which have applied the 
so-called erroneous date rule. For whatever reason this is, the 
important aspect is that they basically reach the same result. It 
is also clear that they are the majority position with respect to 
an at-will termination clause in any type of contract. 
Although to the best knowledge of defendants there is no 
specific Utah case on point, the issue is not really one of first 
impression in Utah. Utah law on contract damages specifically 
limits damages to the amount bargained for. Young Elec. Sign Co. 
v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P. 2d 162 (Utah 1988). Thus 
where the contract provided that the tenant could terminate at 
will, then the measure of damages is that provided in the lease for 
such early termination and not the lease payments over the rest of 
the term of the lease. Accord, Dalton Properties, Inc. v. Jones, 
100 Nev. 422, 683 P.2d 30 (1984). In the present case, the limit 
of Benchmark's damages have also been contractually set. The 
defendants could terminate at any time and the maximum that 
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defendants would have to pay was $40,000.00 plus the six months 
rent (and of course would have to pay nothing if there was cause 
for the termination). 
The reference by Benchmark to Reid v. Mutual of Omaha 
Ins, Co. , 776 P. 2d 896 (Utah 1989) is misleading and not applicable 
to the issues in this case. Even Benchmark admits in its Petition 
for Rehearing that in Reid, there was no right by the tenant to 
terminate at will. Hence, there was no termination clause which 
had to be interpreted and no right of the tenant to reduce the 
amount of rent owed through use of the termination clause. 
Therefore, the ruling in that case that the rental for the entire 
period was owing is completely understandable. Reid simply has no 
application to this case. If there was no termination at will 
clause in the instant case, the parties would not even be arguing 
this point and this court would not have ruled as it did. It is 
precisely because there is such an at will termination clause that 
the issue of limitation of damages is before the court. 
Benchmark has also cited to the court three cases which 
it claims speak for the proposition that if a termination notice 
is not given as specifically prescribed in the contract, then there 
is a breach and the damages run for the full period of the lease. 
At best, the cases cited by Benchmark are in the minority. Further, 
the case of Deschenes v. Conqel, 149 Vt. 579, 547 A.2d 1344 (1988) 
- 10 -
can easily be distinguished from the instant case. In that case 
not only did the tenant not give the proper termination notice, but 
the tenant then sublet the premises and through that subtenant 
continued occupation of the premise for the remainder of the lease 
term. The Vermont court followed the line of cases that hold a 
failure to give proper termination notice does not invoke the 
termination clause. However the court did not get to the remaining 
portion of that line of cases which limits the damages to that 
which would otherwise have been applicable, because the tenant 
continued in possession. Thus the court in that case properly 
ruled that the rent would continue during that period of 
possession. 
The cases of National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co. 
v. 4010 Washington, Inc., 434 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. App. 1968) and A. 
Dubois & Son, Inc. v. Goldsmith Bros., 273 App. Div. 306, 77 N.Y.S. 
2d 473 (1948), appear to have required a strict notice compliance 
and no limitations on damages. However, both cases were from the 
intermediate appellate court level and neither have been cited on 
this proposition in any subsequent cases. Moreover, Dubois does 
not appear to be good law in New York, as is evident from the more 
recent case of G.B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. Helena Rubinstein, Inc., 
47 N.Y.2d 561, 393 N.E.2d 460 (1979), which is a decision by the 
- 11 -
highest state court in New York, and which clearly follows the 
erroneous date rule. 
CONCLUSION 
When defendants gave their notice of termination, they 
believed that they were entitled to terminate for cause. This 
court has determined that that remains a factual issue for which 
this case has been remanded to the trial court. Benchmark would 
require defendants to forfeit their right to the limitation on 
damages which they could invoke at any time by giving six months 
notice, because they sought to terminate for cause. The Lease 
Agreement specifically provided defendants with the right of 
immediate termination for cause as well as the right of termination 
at will upon six months notice. Since the two rights of 
termination do not require the same notice periods, the Lease had 
to contemplate that a termination notice for cause would also 
invoke the longer notice period required for termination at will. 
Thus, if the termination for cause were not upheld, at the very 
least the termination at will clause would come into play. That 
is the position of the law as well. 
The six months rent plus $40,000.00 cap was agreed to by 
Benchmark. It knew that at any time defendants could terminate and 
- 12 -
pay limited damages. This court should continue to sustain that 
limitation and deny the Petition by Benchmark, 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this^P^day of March, 1992. 
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